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Abstract
By the end of Operation Protective Edge in August 2014, the Israel
Defense Force (IDF) claimed to have discovered and destroyed more
than 30 tunnels spanning from beneath Gaza into Israeli territory. Hamas
officials have praised these tunnels as an innovative approach to fighting
an asymmetric war with a far more conventionally powerful Israel. The
purpose of this case study is to examine the complexity of Hamas’ vast
tunneling network by assessing the motivations behind the group’s
decision to construct the network, to identify the factors that enabled
Hamas to engage in such a complex engineering task, and to assess the
level of effectiveness of the tunnel network both strategically and
tactically against the IDF.
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Introduction 
Underground tunnels have long been used in wartime as both an offensive 
and defensive military strategy.1  The motivations underlying groups’ decision 
to engage in tunnel warfare may vary, but oft cited reasons include the 
inherent difficulty associated with finding subterranean structures, and the 
convenient freedom of movement allowed to those who use them.2  The 
purpose of this case study is to provide an exploratory look into why Hamas 
(Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmiyyah—Islamic Resistance Movement3) 
elected to engage in the complex engineering task of constructing a tunneling 
network into Israel, to describe how this process likely played out, and to 
assess the effectiveness of these tunnels as a strategy in Hamas’ ongoing 
conflict with Israel.  Using open sources, we argue that, whether intentional 
or not, the tunnel network was a successful undertaking by the organization 
in several regards: 1. the successful construction of the tunnels themselves,4 2. 
the negative psychological impact the tunnels produced on Israeli citizens, 
and 3. the (limited) success the tunnels have brought in allowing Hamas 
militants entry into Israel.  The following section describes the historical 
context of tunneling and Hamas’ tunneling activity in Gaza.  The Decision and 
Implementation sections will examine the plausible factors leading to Hamas’ 
decision to engage in this complex engineering feat, and details of how the 
tunnel network was most likely constructed.  The Analysis section discusses 
whether the group’s decision to construct tunnels was a successful 
undertaking, while the Conclusion section offers some overarching remarks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Allen D. Reece, “A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary 
Perspective,” School of Advanced Military Studies, December 18, 1997: 1-63, available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a339626.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Levitt, Matthew, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 324. 
4 For recent information on tunnel collapses during the first part of 2016, see: “Hamas 
Operative Killed in Fourth Gaza Tunnel Collapse in Recent Weeks,” Jerusalem Post, 
February 9, 2016, available at: http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Hamas-
operative-killed-in-fourth-Gaza-tunnel-collapse-in-recent-weeks-444356. 
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Context 
Historical Use of Tunnel Warfare  
Tunnels have long been used in times of conflict.5  The use of tunneling in 
historical conflicts has stemmed from a desire and/or need to remain difficult 
to detect.6  Perhaps one of the most familiar examples of tunnel warfare is the 
Viet Cong’s use of underground tunnels during the Vietnam War.  These 
tunnels sometimes connected villages and homes, and were the underground 
location for some public facilities, like hospitals.7  These subterranean 
structures enabled the Viet Cong to evade the U.S. military and conduct 
surprise attacks.  Because they are inherently difficult to locate and target, 
tunnels can provide a valuable defensive asset for groups that are capable of 
constructing them.  Upon their discovery, it is also difficult to accurately 
assess the extent of tunnel networks without proper and specialized 
equipment.8  This difficulty in developing an adequate and accurate 
assessment of an opponent’s tunneling network impacts the destruction 
process; this may not always be a straightforward task, as parts of a tunnel 
may remain intact even if entrances are seemingly destroyed.9  The many 
difficulties associated with locating, assessing, and fully destroying a tunnel 
system, in conjunction with the historical precedence of tunneling in Gaza for 
smuggling purposes, is likely to have influenced Hamas’ decision to construct 
its own tunnel system into Israel.  
 
Hamas’ Historical Use of Tunnels 
In October 2013, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), acting upon information 
received from an unidentified source, discovered a subterranean tunnel 
leading from Gaza into Israeli territory.10  The tunnel, with a total length of 
1,800 meters, stretched 300 meters into Israel, and was later claimed to be 
the work of Hamas, the current governing organization in the Gaza strip and a 
                                                          
5 Donald M. Heilig, “Subterranean Warfare: A Counter to U.S. Airpower,” Air University, 
April, 2000: 1-34, available at: http://www.specwar.info/taktika-strategie/podzemne-
operacie-v-mestskom-prostredi/subterranean-warfare-a-counter-to-us-airpower.pdf. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Reece, “A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary Perspective.” 
8 Heilig, “Subterranean Warfare: A Counter to U.S. Airpower.”  
9 Ibid.  
10 Gilli Cohen, “Where Did the Cement Come From? Leak Leads to Discovery of Mega-
tunnel From Gaza to Israel,” October 23, 2013, available at: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.552162. 
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U.S. Department of State-designated terrorist organization.11  It was later 
discovered that this was just one of many tunnels credited to Hamas for 
infiltrating the Israeli border.  
 
Over the past decade, Hamas in Gaza and Israel have been involved in an 
ever-increasing conflict, with 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, 2012’s Operation 
Pillar of Defense, and 2014’s Operation Protective Edge marking periods of 
direct, intensified attacks between the two groups.  Throughout this time of 
conflict, Hamas has ostensibly been building tunnels for the express purpose 
of increasing its military operational capabilities against the IDF, though it 
remains unclear if the tunnels are explicitly used more for offensive tactics or 
defensive tactics.  During the 50-day Operation Protective Edge specifically, 
the destruction of this tunneling network beneath the Israeli border became 
the key avowed motivation for Israel’s ground offensive.12  Through the course 
of this operation, the IDF claimed it discovered more than 30 tunnels 
extending into Israel.13  
 
However, it should be recognized at the outset that not all tunnels within 
Gaza are used for military operations, or even infiltrating Israel.  Since the 
1980s, smuggling tunnels routing from the Gaza Strip into Egypt have played 
a substantial role in the livelihood of Palestinians by providing supplies and 
employment opportunities for civilians in need of work.14  These smuggling 
tunnels were constructed in response to blockades imposed on the Palestinian 
territories by Egypt and Israel.  Food, weapons, and other goods were and 
continue to be illegally trafficked through these tunnels, playing a significant 
role in Gaza’s economy by generating approximately $700 million per year.15   
                                                          
11 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, (Washington, D.C.: US 
Department of State) available at: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.html. 
12 ICT Database Team, “Operation ‘Protective Edge’: A Detailed Summary of Events,” 
International Institute for Counter Terrorism, July 12, 2014, available at: 
http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1262/Operation-Protective-Edge-A-Detailed-Summary-
of-Events. 
13 Anti-defamation League, “Operation Protective Edge: July-August 2014,” 2015, 
available at: http://www.adl.org/israel-international/israel-middle-
east/content/AG/operation-protective-edge.html. 
14 Shlomi Eldar, “Gaza tunnels take IDF by surprise,” Al-Monitor, July 20, 2014, available 
at: 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/israel-idf-tunnels-gaza-undergr
ound-network-failure-welfare.html. 
15 Hayes Brown, “What You Need To Know About The Tunnels That Bring Life — And 
Death — Into Gaza,” Think Progress, July 2014, available at: 
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Known also as “economic tunnels,” more than 1,000 are thought to have been 
dug beneath the border between Egypt and Gaza under the authority mainly 
of Hamas, who took over the territory from Fatah in 2007.16  As detailed more 
fully below, Palestinians’ and Hamas’ historical experience in engineering and 
operating smuggling tunnels is likely a leading factor contributing to Hamas’ 
decision to dig and construct its tunnel network into Israel.  
 
Although smuggling tunnels have been used since the late 1980s, it is unclear 
exactly how long operational tunnels have existed beneath the Gaza/Israeli 
border.17  The first smuggling tunnel discovery by Israel occurred in 1983;18 
however it is believed that the use of the tunnels for military operations (such 
as the tunnel discovered in October 2013) only really began during the al-
Aqsa Intifada (beginning in September 2000), with tunnel development 
expanding immensely after Hamas took control of Gaza.19  Following Hamas’ 
takeover of Gaza, the makeshift tunnels dug by Fatah during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada fell under the authority of Hamas’ military arm, the Al-Qassam 
Brigades.  It is believed that they were transformed by the Al-Qassam 
Brigades into what have been called “Gaza’s longest, deepest, and most 
sophisticated tunnels” by Israeli engineers.20  According to some 
commentators, many of the more advanced tunnels were constructed 
following the 2012 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, when 
Israel agreed to lift trade bans to allow humanitarian assistance to enter Gaza.  
It is at this point that the newly uninhibited flow of steel and concrete, 
intended for the building of above-ground infrastructure in Gaza, may have 
made the creation of the more sophisticated tunnels possible.21 
 
                                                          
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/07/18/3461742/inside-the-tunnels-that-bring-
life-and-death-into-gaza/a. 
16Karl Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally,” Time, March 
26, 2014, available at: http://time.com/38627/hamas-gaza-tunnels-israel/.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Nicholas Pelham, “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon: the Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s 
Siege,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41:4 (2011/2012). 
19 Shabak.gov, 2008, available at: 
http://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/hamas-tunnel-report.aspx. 
20 Pelham, “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon.” 
21 Ariel Ben Solomon, “Exclusive: US Intelligence source claims Hamas has many more 
tunnels than Israel says,” Mabat USA, July 25, 2014, available at: 
http://mabatusa.com/evan/exclusive-us-intelligence-source-claims-hamas-has-many-
more-tunnels-than-israel-says-by-ariel-ben-solomon/. 
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The operational tunnels potentially serve many purposes, including the 
transfer and storage of weapons,22 facilitating border crossings (below the 
security fence that Israel installed to prevent infiltration), as well as 
functioning defensively as safety corridors for top leaders in the organization, 
affording them and their families mobility and sanctuary.23  In addition, some 
tunnel networks are designed to serve as “war-rooms,” or underground 
bunkers in which leaders convene during times of emergency.  Another 
feature of the operational tunnels is that they are able to serve as covert 
launching pads for rockets targeting Israel.  Rocket launchers may be situated 
at designated tunnel openings to mitigate detection by Israeli surveillance.  
After a rocket launch, tunnel openings may be re-sealed by Al-Qassam 
militants to prevent the IDF from detecting the tunnel’s location.24  Though it 
is unclear whether Hamas uses these launch pads from underground within 
Gaza or within Israel, it seems likely that the group would conduct these 
attacks from openings within Israel to maximize the potential damage caused 
by their mostly short-range (i.e. Qassam) rockets.  Despite these many 
purposes, covert infiltration of Hamas fighters into Israel remains, according 
to many commentators, the key function of the operational tunnels. 
 
Decision 
Several factors are likely to have motivated Hamas’ decision making in 
digging an extensive tunnel network into Israel. For instance, the decision 
might be noted as one of many responses to Israel’s military superiority to 
compensate for a perceived power imbalance.  According to one Hamas 
commander, Abu Laith, the 2008 air strikes and air surveillance conducted by 
Israeli forces during Operation Cast Lead cost the group significantly, 
spurring it to dig operational tunnels into Israeli territory as a way of moving 
                                                          
22 Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Exclusive: Hamas fighters show defiance in Gaza tunnel tour,” 
Reuters, August 19, 2014 available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0GJ1HS20140819. 
23 Shane Harris, “Extensive Hamas Tunnel Network Points to Israeli Intelligence Failure,” 
Foreign Policy, July 31, 2014, available at: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/31/extensive-hamas-tunnel-network-points-to-
israeli-intelligence-failure/. 
24 Jonathan Halevi, “Hamas’ Attack Tunnels: Analysis and Initial Implications,” 
Jesusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 22, 2014, available at: http://jcpa.org/hamas-
attack-tunnels/. 
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the battle underground.25,26  Reaching depths of at least 30 feet, the tunnels 
enable Hamas militants to evade detection and provide covert storage of the 
groups’ weaponry and equipment, demonstrating the defensive advantage in 
tunneling.  A dominant narrative that seems to underlie the group’s decision 
to construct these resource-intensive tunnels is this power imbalance between 
Hamas and the IDF.  This decision to engage in tunnel construction is often 
justified by Hamas specifically as a means of leveling the playing field. 
Hamas leader Khaled Meshal described the motivation behind the 
construction of the tunnel network as a response to Israel’s greater military 
capabilities: “In light of the balance of power which shifted towards Israel, we 
had to be creative in finding innovative ways. The tunnels were one of our 
innovations. As they say, necessity is the mother of invention.”27 In addition, 
at a March 2014 rally in Gaza, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh announced: 
 
“The tunnels we are inaugurating today are the new Hamas strategy in 
the war against Israel--the strategy of the tunnels. From belowground 
and aboveground, you, the occupiers, will be dismissed. You have no 
place in the land of Palestine...What the resistance forces are preparing 
secretly for the next confrontation with Israel is beyond imagination 
for Israel.”28 
The tunnels have thus also been touted by Hamas leadership as the secret to 
their successful attacks and their new strategic warfare.29  Indeed, a document 
that was disseminated to other Palestinian factions, describing the purpose of 
the tunnels, claimed that the tunnels would pose an unprecedented challenge 
                                                          
25 Rois Kais, “Hamas fighter: We have more weapons, can hit more Israeli cities,” Ynet 
News, August 7, 2014, available at: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
4555937,00.html. 
26 Lazar Berman, “Tunnels still intact, say Hamas, Al-Jazeera,” The Times of Israel, 
August 8, 2014, available at: 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/tunnels-still-intact-say-hamas-commander-al-jazeera/. 
27 Daniel Rubenstein, “Hamas’ tunnel network: A massacre in the making,” Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs, available at: http://jcpa.org/hamas-tunnel-network/. 
28 Maayan Lubell, “Tunnel attack fear turn Gaza border kibbutzim into a ghost town,” 
Reuters, July 22, 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/22/us-
palestinians-israel-tunnels-idUSKBN0FR1KV20140722. 
29 Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally.” 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
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to Israel.  The document revealed the group’s intentions to deliver a surprise 
attack that would leave Israel with limited opportunity to defend itself.30 
However, the opportunity provided by Hamas’ prior experience constructing 
smuggling tunnels is likely the lead motivating factor in the group’s decision 
to construct tunnels for operational purposes.  As described above, these 
smuggling tunnels played a role in facilitating imports of fuel, vehicles, 
weapons, explosives, rockets, and other strategic tools used by Hamas to fight 
the IDF.31  However, they also at one time provided Hamas with strategic 
positioning for attacking IDF operation centers situated within Gaza.  Before 
Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2005, there were several reported instances of 
attacks on the IDF carried out by planting explosive devices in tunnels 
situated beneath IDF positions.32  The detonation of an explosive device 
planted beneath an IDF base in 2001 resulted in injury to three IDF soldiers.  
Another instance where explosives were planted underneath IDF positions 
resulted in the death of one IDF soldier and injured five others.33  Scenarios 
such as these possibly served as the genesis for the decision to use tunnels 
extending from Gaza into Israel. 
 
Finally, there has been some suggestion that one motivation for the 
development of the tunnels system stems from the desire to provide work for 
the movement’s thousands of armed men who have nothing to do when not 
fighting.  According to Shlomi Eldar, a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Israel 
Pulse, digging tunnels provides an operational occupation for thousands of 
Hamas members with a strong desire to fight.34  Digging tunnels thus 
provides these men with a distraction and hope that their ability to conduct 
operations against Israel will be enhanced in the future.35 
 
Organization 
                                                          
30 Adnan Abu Amer, “Tunnel May Signal Shift in Hamas-Israel Conflict,” Al-Monitor, 
October 22, 2013, available at: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/gaza-tunnel-israel-shift-hamas-war.html#. 
31 Rubenstein, “Hamas’ tunnel network: A massacre in the making..  
32 Terrence McCoy, “How Hamas uses its tunnels to kill and capture Israeli soldiers,” July 
21, 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/07/21/how-hamas-uses-its-tunnels-to-kill-and-capture-israeli-soldiers/. 
33 Rubenstein, “Hamas’ tunnel network: A massacre in the making.”  
34 Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas Spends Downtime Digging Tunnels,” Al-Monitor, October 15, 
2013, available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/hamas-gaza-
tunnels-israel-jihad.html. 
35 Ibid. 
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The identities of the key figures in charge of making the decision to embark 
on the tunnel construction as an operational strategy against Israel are not 
definitively known.  This is largely due to the complex leadership structure 
and decision making within Hamas.  The ultimate authority to decide the 
broader agenda of the movement ostensibly belongs to the Shura Council 
within Hamas, the leadership body at the apex of the organizational chain of 
command.36  However, day-to-day operations by the group fall within the 
scope of the political bureau within Hamas, with military operations more 
specifically falling within the scope of the group’s military wing, the Al-
Qassam Brigades.  While some have claimed that there is no single leader 
within the movement who makes all decisions, it has been acknowledged that 
the Al-Qassam Brigades have a high degree of autonomy to operate and carry 
out missions as they see fit.37  Indeed, despite the ambiguity regarding the 
group’s leadership structure, some experts claim that the decision to 
implement the tunnel strategy was pushed by Mohammed Deif, the current 
head of the Al-Qassam Brigades.38  It is thus suspected that the tunnels are 
constructed, maintained, and operated by the members of the Al-Qassam 
Brigades.  Some fighters have even described these tunnels as being 
synonymous with their own homes, as they built the tunnels “with their own 
hands.”39  
 
This indoctrination of Al-Qassam militants with respect to Hamas’ mission of 
engaging in tunnel warfare might provide a certain degree of risk tolerance for 
the organization in this regard.  Hamas takes a significant risk of 
disenchanting their militants and alienating the Gazan people with their 
tunnel strategy, as Israel’s response to Hamas attacks has often resulted in 
many thousands of casualties, including civilians, as well as widespread 
destruction of infrastructure within Gaza.  Furthermore, tunnel construction 
has been acknowledged as a highly dangerous job, with casualties resulting 
                                                          
36 Bertie, Benedetta, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration, 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).  
37 Hroub, Khaled, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, (London: Pluto Press, 2010). 
38 “Deep underground, Mohammed Deif shapes Hamas war with Israel” The Jordan 
Times, August 14, 2014, available at: http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/deep-
underground-mohammed-deif-shapes-hamas-war-israel. 
39 Al-Mughrabi, “Exclusive: Hamas fighters show defiance in Gaza tunnel tour.” 
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from cave-ins being not uncommon.40,41  Therefore, the dedication towards the 
overarching cause remains an important factor in whether and how resilient 
Hamas can be—as it is the Al-Qassam militants who perform the tunnel 
construction and carry out the attacks through the tunnels.  As evidenced by 
reports of Hamas resuming its tunnel digging immediately following 
Operation Protective Edge,42 its leaders seem willing to accept the risks 
associated with the tunnel program.  
 
Implementation 
As noted above, though not officially identified, the individuals responsible 
for implementing the tunnel network are believed to be Mohammed Deif, the 
current leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades, as well as (formerly) Ahmed al-
Jaabari, the former operational head of the Brigades who was killed by IDF 
forces in 2012.43  Given the degree of complexity involved in coordinating 
such an operation, it is likely that the effort has had many members involved 
in the planning and execution process.  While much of the implementation 
process mirrored that of the smuggling tunnels, some sources note other 
influences on the development of the tunnel system into Israel, namely those 
tracing back to influences stemming from Hezbollah, Iran, and North Korea.44  
Resources from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also reportedly 
aided Hamas in the funding and the construction of tunnels.45 
 
The implementation of this complex project requires many types of technical 
expertise, likely including individuals with specialized knowledge in structural 
engineering, geology, electrical engineering, and mining.  There is insufficient 
information to state with any certainty whether the organization sought out 
specific expertise to inform its attack tunneling efforts or whether it acquired 
                                                          
40Xinhua, “Tunnel cave-in kills five Hamas militants in Gaza: security officials,” 
Globaltimes, June 19, 2014, available at: 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/866651.shtml. 
41 “Hamas Operative Killed in Fourth Gaza Tunnel Collapse in Recent Weeks.” 
42 Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas focuses on rebuilding tunnels as Gazans Suffer,” Almonitor, 
March 5, 2015, available at: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/hamas-digging-tunnels-attack-israel-blockade-
gaza-strip.html. 
43 “Deep underground, Mohammed Deif shapes Hamas war with Israel.”; “Ahmed 
Jaabari: elusive Hamas military chief,” The Jordan Times, November 14, 2012, available 
at: http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/ahmed-jaabari-elusive-hamas-military-
chief. 
44 Halevi, “Hamas’ Attack Tunnels: Analysis and Initial Implications.” 
45 Ibid. 
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the expertise via an iterative process of trial and error.  However, one 
individual, Akram Juda, was designated by Israel as Hamas’ lead electrical 
and mechanical engineer.  Juda was indicted by Israel, which held him 
responsible for the assembly of engines for drills, assembly of weapons such 
as rockets and bombs, for rectifying electrical issues, and solving additional 
engineering complications within the attack tunnels.  According to his 
indictment in 2009, a Hamas commander offered him to work on electricity 
in the tunnel network, paying him $300 a month.46 
 
Although the number of states supporting Hamas’ combat operations remains 
limited, Hamas’ tunnel engineering task has likely been greatly influenced by 
Hezbollah and Iran.  In the period leading up to the Second Lebanon War, 
which lasted from July 12, 2006 through August 14, 2006, Iran provided 
guidance to Hezbollah to assist in its development of subterranean tunnels to 
gain leverage against Israel.47  North Korea also assisted Hezbollah by 
providing engineers to aid with the planning and creation of the tunnels.  The 
attack tunnels that exist beneath the Gaza strip appear to reflect the same 
sophistication and ingenuity as those constructed by Hezbollah under 
southern Lebanon.  The collaboration among these actors with respect to 
tunnel construction was likely driven by the same factors underlying their 
general collaboration–the common objective of undermining Israel (in this 
case, quite literally).  Although past collaborations among these actors are 
believed to have provided Hamas with influential assistance in taking on its 
attack tunnel engineering tasks, Hamas’ failure to support Bashar Al-Assad in 
the Syrian Civil War (March 2011 to Present) resulted in some distancing 
between Hamas and Hezbollah / Iran.48  Despite the differences in their 
                                                          
46 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel indicts Hamas tunnel engineer,” The Jerusalem Post, 
November 11, 2014, available at: http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israel-
indicts-Hamas-tunnel-engineer-381466. 
47 Emily Harris, “The Long History of the Gaza Tunnels,” NPR, July 26, 2014, available at: 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/07/26/335332220/the-long-history-of-
the-gaza-tunnels. 
48 Mariam Karouny, “Hamas calls on Hezbollah to unite fight against Israel,” Al Arabiya 
News, January 22, 2015, available at:  
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/22/Hamas-calls-on-
Hezbollah-to-unite-fight-against-Israel.html; Con Coughlin, “Iran Rekindles Relations 
with Hamas,” The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2015, available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-rekindles-relations-with-hamas-1429658562. 
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positions on supporting Al-Assad, Hamas appears to have recently improved 
relations with Iran49 and is still seeking to improve relations with Hezbollah.50 
 
 
 
Security 
An important part of any complex engineering endeavor is to ensure the 
safety and security of those who are implementing the project and the project 
itself.  The precise safety measures, if any, applied to those constructing the 
tunnels is difficult to ascertain from open sources.  However, it may be 
reasonable to assume that Hamas incorporated some safety regulations to 
protect its tunnel workers, as members tasked with tunnel digging are held in 
very high esteem within the organization.  The group seems to take significant 
precautions to conceal the locations of the tunnels and to thwart IDF 
intelligence gathering.  Tunnels are strictly supervised by Hamas members, 
and civilians are kept at a great distance from the sites.51  To ensure that 
tunnel workers did not record any aspects of tunnel work, Hamas conducts 
strip searches for recording devices.52  Some diggers are instructed to cover 
their faces and use code names.  These security measures were enacted to 
reduce the risk of diggers acquiring information that could be shared with 
Israel.  Some sources have also indicated that tunnel workers may have been 
executed to prevent intelligence leaks to Israel.53 
 
Digging Process 
The need for security remains perhaps one of the most critical underlying 
differences between the development of previous smuggling tunnels and the 
tunnels constructed for military operations.  There is an imperative to remain 
inconspicuous and complete the work undetected by the IDF so as to 
maximize the potential use of the tunnels.  During Operation Protective Edge, 
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for example, Israel deployed drone surveillance over Gaza for the purpose of 
keeping a watchful eye for tunnel diggers and, consequently, tunnels.54  To 
offset the general risk posed by Israel’s comprehensive surveillance, Hamas 
operatives have taken measures to ensure the sites of tunnel entrances were 
inconspicuous, and that the excavation process was done as subtly as 
possible.  This need for clandestine operations translated to the group’s use of 
excavation tools that make little noise relative to high-powered machines with 
loud engines. 55,56  Tunnel diggers mainly use their hands in the digging 
process, 57 only wielding electric or pneumatic jackhammers to break through 
hard rock or solidly packed dirt.58,59  Most of the digging is done in softer soil 
or sand, using shovels.60  Diggers take pains to excavate the dirt as 
inconspicuously as possible, often removing the sand in boxes or bags slowly 
to mitigate the potential for detection.61  As diggers progress through the 
tunnel, removing dirt and rock, the sides and ceiling are reinforced by 
concrete panels produced near the location of the dig sites. 
 
The total cost of excavating the tunnels has been estimated to have claimed 
about forty percent of Hamas’ total budget since construction began.62  Where 
each tunnel is estimated to have cost about $60,000 to $200,000 to construct 
initially, the total cost of excavating and maintaining the tunnels is estimated 
to cost approximately $1 million each.63  Though very costly to maintain, the 
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group’s rapid resumption of tunnel building activity directly following 
Operation Protective Edge appears to indicate that the organization has 
sufficient financial resources to both construct tunnels and recover from 
losses caused by Israeli attacks.   
  
Sources suggest that between five and seven militants are involved in the 
actual digging process at a time.64  These individuals are able to stay 
underground for significant lengths of time due to certain provisions they are 
afforded.  Often, the tunnels are packed with sufficient amounts of food and 
water so that the diggers are able to work uninterrupted for extended periods 
of time.  Some reports about the tunnels noted the presence of several 
months’ worth of food and provisions.65  The tunnel diggers are considered to 
be elite members of the Al-Qassam Brigades, and are viewed as “members of 
a profession.”66  They most likely are drawn from the Engineering Unit of the 
Qassam Brigades, the arm that is charged with constructing the tunnels used 
in military operations.67  Due to the dangers associated with their job, tunnel 
diggers are generously compensated by the organization.68  Barring any 
disasters during the digging process, such as collapses, diggers are able to 
advance an average of approximately four to five meters a day69 and can 
complete an operational tunnel in nine to ten months,70 though tunnels have 
been found that have taken upwards of two years to construct.71 
 
Tunnel Characteristics 
Hamas’ operational tunnels consist of a single main shaft, connected to 
multiple offshoots that lead elsewhere in Gaza, or that spawn different exits 
into Israel to facilitate the group’s surprise attacks from different locations.  
The tunnels themselves typically begin from an inconspicuous location in 
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Gaza, a few hundred meters from the border with Israel.72  Typically, these are 
civilian structures, such as a chicken coop or the home of individuals who are 
paid by Hamas.  During Operation Protective Edge, the IDF reported that all 
of the tunnels that they located and destroyed began within buildings.73  
Hamas may build from or near civilian infrastructure because of Israel’s 
reticence to deploy air strikes on civilian locations.  However, even the 
entrances that are located outside and not within these structures are difficult 
to find, the search for them having been equated by IDF officials as trying to 
locate a “needle in a haystack.”74  Tunnel entrances have been described as 
“tiny,” with openings less than one meter in width, which probably aids in this 
camouflage.75 
         
The main shaft of the tunnel may be reached by descending ladders extending 
from the opening, or by foot.  Tunnels vary in depth and length, but some of 
the tunnels that have been found by IDF forces during Operation Protective 
Edge were reported to range from depths of about forty-five feet to one 
hundred feet underground.76  Tunnels that are dug to depths closer to the one 
hundred feet range are typically done so in response to the threat of detection 
that is posed by sonar devices.77 
         
The ceilings of the tunnels are normally tall enough to allow soldiers to walk 
through with a slightly stooped posture,78 though some areas of the tunnel are 
raised enough to allow for walking while fully erect.79  Additionally, the 
tunnels are reported to be wide enough for militants to walk through, single-
file.  While these tunnels are equipped with light sources throughout, 
enabling militants to see for some distance ahead, visibility tends to be 
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somewhat limited by the ambient light.80  The interior provisions of the 
tunnels often include things that facilitate the movement of heavy objects 
(weaponry,81 abductees,82 or other materials), such as tracks, carts, and pulley 
systems.83  The interior of the tunnels are also characterized by networks of 
visible wires and cables that comprise electrical and communications 
systems.84  Installing separate communication lines as opposed to using the 
established cellular network is done because of the unreliable network 
coverage that exists when operating at certain depths below ground, in 
addition to the vulnerabilities to IDF intelligence that exist when using 
cellular lines to communicate.85 
 
Analysis 
The purpose of this case study was to provide an exploratory look into why 
Hamas chose to engage in the complex engineering task of constructing a 
tunneling network into Israel, to describe the process of tunnel construction, 
and to assess the effectiveness of these tunnels as a strategy in Hamas’ 
ongoing conflict with Israel.  In line with other groups that have historically 
used tunnels to engage in covert military operations (i.e. moving undetected 
between locations, conducting surprise attacks, using underground facilities 
as a storage point for both weapons and people), Hamas has taken up 
tunneling under its enemy’s territory as a means of increasing its operational 
capabilities.  Up to this point, we have delineated several likely motivations 
behind Hamas’ decision to engage in tunnel construction.  Most prominent, 
we think, is the historical precedence of tunneling, albeit for smuggling 
purposes, in the Gaza strip.  After examining the intricacies involved in the 
actual construction process, the question that must be addressed next is 
whether Hamas’ development of the tunnel network was successful for the 
group in terms of both task execution and strategy.  Drawing our conclusions 
from the open-source literature, we propose that Hamas was successful in the 
execution of the tunneling itself, and also that the group enjoyed strategic 
success through the negative psychological impact instilled in Israeli citizens.  
In terms of overall success conducting ground offensives and infiltration of 
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Israeli territory (again, an ostensible goal of the tunnels), Hamas has enjoyed 
less success.  
 
1. Successful construction of tunnels—The use of tunnels in warfare has 
proven to be a viable defensive tactic throughout history, especially 
due to the difficulties associated with successful location and 
assessment of scope. The above discussion has shown that 
(notwithstanding some collapses), Hamas has been successful in 
constructing and maintaining a multitude of tunnels.  Moreover, even 
if located, tunnel destruction could prove difficult, as there is no 
guarantee that the tunnel would be fully destroyed.  Some segments 
may remain intact, even after detonating an explosive to trigger a 
collapse.  Following the IDF’s campaign to eliminate the tunnels 
during Operation Protective Edge, Hamas claimed that the IDF’s 
destruction of 30 tunnels was only a portion of the total number of 
tunnels it constructed into Israel.86  Furthermore, it claimed that the 
tunnels that were reportedly destroyed by IDF forces were not 
completely destroyed, and that they were able to rebuild sections that 
were collapsed.87  However, there is no guarantee that this information 
is not the product of Hamas propaganda.  Regardless of how many 
tunnels Hamas has retained, the execution of the task of building 
military tunnels should be regarded overall as successful, given that 
the tunnels were well-equipped with the requisite technology and 
weaponry that would turn a simple smuggling tunnel into an 
operational tunnel for military purposes.  
 
2. Negative psychological impact on Israeli citizens—One could also 
argue that Hamas was successful in a less direct sense, specifically, 
through the side effect of fear produced amongst Israeli citizens, 
especially those living near the Gaza border.88  The discovery of the 
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complexity of the tunnel system has succeeded in raising great concern 
in the IDF, and in Israeli citizens.  Several sources portraying Israeli 
civilians’ reactions to the discovery have suggested a negative 
psychological impact resulting from fear of the tunnels, and of being 
kidnapped.89  Indeed, one could relate prior research conducted on 
fear of victimization and crime that suggests that perceived risk, and 
not necessarily actual risk, is sufficient to affect individuals’ fear of 
victimization.90  This notion was examined in a study conducted with 
Israeli university students attending school in an area undergoing 
constant rocket attacks in 2008.  The study revealed that actual risk of 
being victimized by rocket attacks was not necessarily a predictor of 
taking precautionary safety actions.  For instance, students who lived 
within the attack zone generally had less concern about their personal 
risk and taking precautionary actions than those who lived outside of 
the attack zone.91  This supports the notion that, regardless of the 
actual risk of being attacked, whether via missile attacks or tunnel 
infiltrations, the perceived risk is sufficient to produce fear amongst a 
populace, especially when supplemented with widespread Israeli (and 
international) media coverage on the tunnels.  Though we would be 
remiss in equating fully the fear of victimization with actual 
victimization, fear has been associated with a host of negative 
outcomes, including detrimental effects on mental and physical health 
and quality of life in general.92  Thus, the tunnels under the Israeli 
border, and the uncertainty they bring with them in terms of location, 
length, and number of openings, may potentially inflict much more 
damage on Israel than any single ground attack on IDF posts could 
achieve.  
 
3. Limited success in ground offensives—The tunnels have been used by 
militants in several successful operations against Israeli forces that 
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included the detonation of explosives beneath IDF positions in Gaza, 
or small teams of Hamas militants leading surprise attacks on IDF 
positions in Israel.  However, these were limited in scope and impact.  
Several July 2014 infiltrations near the Israeli villages of Sufa and Nir-
Am and at Israeli security post Nahal Oz ended in the total deaths of 11 
IDF soldiers, though Hamas experienced casualties as well.93  In 
another incident in 2013, Hamas fighters disguised as members of the 
IDF killed two soldiers after attacking an army patrol car.94 The 
abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006 appears to be the most notable 
instance of a successful operation led by Hamas using tunnels.  In 
June 2006, Hamas militants entered Israel via the underground 
network and abducted Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier.95  In 2011, Shalit 
was traded to Israel in an exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.96  A 
senior Israeli intelligence official described the exchange as “one of the 
most asymmetrical incidents in recent memory.”97  
 
The evidence of successful attacks provided here may lead one to argue that 
the tunnel network amounted to an overall operational failure due to the 
limited number and scope of these attacks—i.e. the number of IDF members 
killed or injured relative to the number of Hamas militants killed.  One could 
also argue that the number of Gaza civilians who were killed during each 
response by the IDF, and the reinstatement of the blockade by Israel98 in 
response to finding a tunnel system in October 2013, is further evidence of 
this overall failure.  Considered in such a purely rational calculus, the task of 
tunneling was therefore not successful in meeting Hamas’ likely intended goal 
of conducting effective ground offensives and potentially mimicking the 
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singular incident involving Gilad Shalit, as the heavy costs associated with 
construction and IDF retaliation amount to more than the benefits realized by 
using the tunnels for offensive and defensive purposes. 
 
If not subscribing to a strict cost/benefit calculation, however, it can be 
alternatively argued that the tunnel network was an operational success in 
light of the power imbalance at the outset.  The idea that Hamas was able to 
carry out several successful ground offensives on IDF military posts and 
inflict casualties of any number could be considered a success for the 
organization and its larger cause, given the fact that the tunnel network was 
never expected to meet Israel’s military force one to one.  The idea that the 
group has been able to cause what little damage it has may be even more 
meaningful given the extensive resources that go into Israel’s maintaining a 
very capable and sophisticated military operation,99 including substantial 
resources devoted to locating and eliminating Hamas tunnels. 
 
Conclusion 
In this case study, we have set forth several reasons why Hamas may have 
decided to construct a network of tunnels into Israel.  We propose that the 
decision was a culmination of several factors, but was mainly due to the 
historical use and knowledge of building smuggling tunnels in Gaza. Despite 
the limited success associated with the use of attack tunnels as an offensive 
tool in its conflict with Israel, Hamas was very successful in the construction 
of these advanced tunnels, and in consequently instilling a certain degree of 
fear within its enemy.  Structurally, the tunnels are well built and have 
allowed Hamas to carry out several offensive operations against the IDF.  The 
idea that the group was able to inflict damage upon Israel, whether that be 
physically, psychologically, or politically,100 could, in our view, be considered 
a successful undertaking.  Nevertheless, our analysis and conclusions must be 
tempered by the fact that this study relies almost entirely on open-source 
material, much of it stemming from Israeli sources.  Taking this into 
consideration, we propose that Hamas’ decision to construct these 
operational tunnels, and the level of structural sophistication achieved, 
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certainly represents a successful effort, at least from the perspective of a 
complex engineering task.  
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